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Summary findings
In the past decade, Latin America has taken the lead in  James argues that in fact traditional systems produce
structural pension reform which replaces a publicly  many inequities, both within cohorts and across cohorts.
managed pay-as-you-go defined-benefit system with a  So it is possible for pension reform to improve both
system of privately managed, fully funded defined-  equity and efficiency  - a win-win situation rather than a
contribution  accounts supplemented by a social safety  tradeoff. The reforms undertaken  thus far have indeed
net. This arrangement  is designed to improve efficiency  reduced existing equity problems, but some old equity
and growth, and preliminary evidence suggests that it has  problems remain and some new ones have been created.
been successful in doing so.  The main policy lesson is this: Pension reforms should
But traditional social security systems have been  be carefully designed to improve equity as well as
justified on the grounds that they are equitable and  efficiency and growth. Only further empirical analyses
redistribute to low-income groups. Are we in danger of  will determine whether the redistributional goal has been
exchanging equity for efficiency?  achieved.
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During the  past decade,  Latin America has been in the forefront of  pension
reform. The experiment that started in 1980 with Chile has been carried on by
Argentina, Colombia,  Peru,  Mexico and  Uruguay.  The reforms  have  usually been sold
on grounds of their impact on efficiency and growth. What about their impact on
equity and equality? Traditional social security systems have frequently been
justified on grounds that they are equitable and redistribute to low income
groups--this has been cited as a trade-off for the inefficiencies that they
entail. As social security systems around the world reform, are we in danger of
exchanging equity for efficiency?
This  paper argues that  traditional  systems--that is,  pay-as-you-go defined
benefit systems--in fact  produce many inequities,  both within cohorts and  across
cohorts. These inequities have been found in every country where these systems
exist, with some of the most egregious examples in Latin America. In fact, from
the vantage point of the average citizen, the inequities may have been a more
potent rationale for reform than the inefficiencies.
The  reforms,  which  typically replace a  publicly-managed pay-as-you-go
defined benefit  (PAYG  DB) system  with a system of  privately-managed fully funded
defined contribution (FF  DC) accounts supplemented  by a social  safety  net, reduce
the  pre-existing equity  problems.  Moreover,  by  raising  national saving,  deepening
the financial markets through which these savings are funnelled, and reducing
labor market distortions, they also enhance growth. In this sense, the recent
wave of  pension reforms  have the  potential to improve  both equity and  efficiency.
Have they fulfilled this potential?
Recent research  has attempted  to  quantify  the efficiency  gains in  Chile and
elsewhere. However, the distributional effects have not yet been quantified.
While removing the pre-existing inequities, especially the inter-generational
1  The first half of this paper draws heavily on World Bank 1994. Averting
the Old Acre  Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old and Promote Growth, of which
Estelle James was the principal author.inequities,  in  some  cases  the  reforms  have  appeared  to  create  new  equity
problems. Some of these were due to design features of the reform that could be
changed, underscoring  the  importance of designing reform policies and  their
implementation with great care. Some  were due to the advantages that people with
more income, assets and education always have over those with less, that cannot
so easily be changed. At the same time, we must recognize that the concept of
equity  means  different  things  in different  societies,  so  it  would  not  be
surprising to find varying distributional outcomes across reforming countries.
In this paper I loosely define equity to mean redistributing from high to low
earners or other redistributions that are explicitly agreed upon collectively
after an open discussion.
Part I  briefly outlines the inefficiencies introduced by traditional PAYG
DB pension systems. Part II summarizes the inequities they created. Part III
shows how the reformed systems have improved efficiency and growth, and Part IV
discusses their equity effects, both positive and negative.
I. Inefficiencies in PAYG DB Systems
The inefficiencies introduced by PAYG DB systems are well known and will
be only briefly summarized here. They include:
High payroll taxes with negative effects on employment. Most traditional
systems  are  financed  through  payroll  taxes,  which  rise  dramatically  as
populations age and engender labor  market distortions--less employment  and labor
effort--unless the supply of labor is totally inelastic. In Brazil, Ecuador,
Paraguay and Uruguay, payroll taxes for pensions exceed 20%, placing them among
the highest in the world--on par with European countries where the populations
are  much older. While empirical evidence suggests that take-home  pay rather than
employinent  falls in industrialized countries, this is less likely to  be the case
in developing countries  where workers can easily  escape to the informal sector.
Allocation of labor  to the informal  sector.  High  payroll tax rates  that are
not linked to benefits lead to evasion and escape to the informal sector. Since
2firms in the informal sector have less access to capital and product markets,
labor is likely to be less productive there. In many Latin American countries
over 40% of the labor force works in the informal sector, partly in order to
avoid high payroll taxes, and the informal sector is growing rapidly in other
regions such as Eastern Europe (World  Bank 1994, p. 123).
Early retirement. Most DB plans provide for early retirement with little
or no  reduction in pension amount. Early retirement promises are tempting to
policy-makers because they  hide  unemployment or  constitute  a  give-away to  special
groups. The initial cost is low, but the long run cost, as many workers retire
early, is high, both in terms  of its  deleterious impact on the system's finances
and its negative impact on the supply of experienced labor in the economy.
National  saving. While many  economists believe  that PAYG  systems have
decreased national saving and therefore growth, other economists disagree; the
case has not been unambiguously decided. But it does seem clear that funded
systems can be used to increase national saving, and thereby correct sub-optimal
savinq that may result from other causes (myopia,  high private discount rates,
taxation of investment returns  or corporate  profits)  . Traditional systems  do not
make this efficiency-improving correction.
Low  returns  on  publicly  managed  reserves.  Occasionally  PAYG  systems
accumulate  reserves  as  revenues  may  exceed  expenditures  temporarily.  In
traditional systems these reserves have been publicly managed. It is difficult
to secure  data on the  returns to these  reserves, but  data gathered for  the 1980's
indicate that publicly managed pension reserves fared poorly and in many cases
lost  money-  -largely  because  public  managers  were required  to invest  in  government
securities or loans to failing state enterprises, at low  nominal interest rates
that became negative real rates during inflationary periods. At the same time,
privately managed pension funds were earning high returns, in countries where
they  play  a  large  role--because  they  were  able  to  invest  in  diversified
portfolios on a competitive basis  (World  Bank 1994,  p 95). Clearly this poses a
problem for the financial sustainability of the  publicly managed funds. It also
indicates that their capital may have been inefficiently allocated--making it
3easier for governments or state enterprises to run large deficits or to spend
more wastefully than they could if they had to rely on a more accountable source
of funds and making it more difficult for the private sector to get access to
these funds for productive  investment. More generally, political rather than
economic objectives are likely to determine the allocation of publicly-managed
pension reserves, and therefore the impact on productivity is not maximized.
Misallocation of public resources. As expenditures mount, these reserves
disappear and traditional systems in many countries have run large deficits,
which then become the responsibility of the government. In 1990 Austria, Italy
and Uruguay spent more than one-third  of their  public budgets on pensions. Since
the  government's  ability  to  tax  is  limited  by  economic  and  political
considerations, high  public pension spending can squeeze  out government spending
on growth-promoting  investments such as infrastructure, education and health
services, or it  can lead to inflation--a  long  term  problem in  many Latin  American
countries--if  the government tries to maintain this spending through deficit
finance.
II. Inequities in Traditional PAYG DB Systems
Less well known are the inequities in traditional PAYG DB systems. These
inequities fall into two major categories: better treatment for high than low
income groups within cohorts stemming from the DB nature of the programs and
transfers from  younger to older generations stemming from their PAYG financing.
Many  of  these  inequities  cannot  be  corrected  by  simple  design  changes--to
eliminate them requires a basic structural reform.
Better  treatment of high  income groups. At  first glance,  the benefit
formulas of  most public DB system look  progressive (that  is, redistributive from
rich to poor) or, at least,  distributionally  neutral. However, empirical studies
of lifetime transfers, i.e.  the  present  value  of lifetime  benefits received  minus
lifetime contributions paid,  in countries as diverse as the U.S., U.K.,  the
Netherlands and Sweden, show  little if  any redistribution from  rich to  poor (for
4a summary of this literature see World Bank 1994, pp. 133-34)  . In fact, in pre-
reform Latin America it  is likely  that the redistribution  went the  other way. How
can this be?
Several factors are at work, making traditional systems inequitable while
they create the appearance of equity. First of all, it is by now a well-known
fact that high income people live longer than low income people. High income
people have access to  better medical technology, nutrition  and information about
healthier  life styles. As a result, even if the annual benefit formula looks
progressive, this is partially counteracted by the fact that high income people
live longer and collect benefits for more years. Many  low income people  die
before they even begin to collect pensions. This source of regressivity appears
inevitably in defined  benefit schemes, as  well as  any other scheme where  high and
low income people  are mandatorily put  into the same annuity pool. It can be
avoided only if different annuity terms are applied according to socio-economic
status  (recognizing that this signals different risk categories)  ,  or  if the
purchase of an annuity is not obligatory.
Second, high income people enter the labor force later than low income
people, but often get pension credits while attending university, even though
they don't contribute. This inequity could be corrected by granting credit only
for years of actual contributions, but politically this has been difficult to
achieve in  unfunded DB  plans. Third,  higher income  groups frequently  are eligible
for superior benefit formulas. For example, in Brazil they have an easier time
documenting  their  years  of  covered  employment  and  qualifying  for  early
retirement. In Ecuador they can borrow from the pension fund at negative real
rates of return. In  Costa Rica some  privileged occupations have, until recently,
received replacement rate of 100% or more of their final wage.
Also favoring high income  people are their steeper age-earning profiles.
Often DB schemes base their benefits on wages earned during the last 3 or 5 or
10 years  of employment. Then, workers with  steep age-earnings profiles have
contributed for  many years according  to their lower  wages  when  young, but receive
a pension that is  based on their  higher wages shortly  before retirement. Even if
5the averaging period for the reference wage base is extended to 30 or 40 years,
workers with steep  age-earnings  profiles  have a  lifetime  distributional advantage
relative to those  with flat  profiles,  because the  present value of  their lifetime
contributions will be smaller  even if they  have the  same average reference wage.
This problem could be avoided by giving accrual rates that  vary according to the
age at which each contribution was made--but this becomes very complicated and,
in the limit, very much like a DC plan.
Furthermore, given that poor people probably have a higher discount rate
than rich people, the utility cost of the required contribution for the poor is
probably greater than that for the rich. Adding to this is the likelihood that
when a retirement plan is introduced rich people can maintain their previous
consumption levels by reducing voluntary saving while poor people often have no
voluntary saving to reduce. In other words, the shift in lifetime consumption
from youth to old age is more binding for low income groups and is more easily
offset by high income groups--an observation which  is related  to the higher
initial discount rate of the former. These problems, incidentally, are retained
for all  schemes that tax people now  in return for retirement  income later,
including the  reformed schemes  that  put these  contributions  into  mandatory saving
plans.
Financing  methods  also  lead  to  regressivity.  Typically,  only  labor
earnings are taxed--and almost invariably  with a ceiling on taxable wages. This
means that the full income of poor people is taxed, while only a portion of the
income of rich people is taxed. Since a flat tax  (the  same rate for rich and
poor) is generally used, it follows that poor people pay a higher proportion of
their income in social security taxes than do rich people, another factor that
leads to a  higher discount rate and  utility loss for them. This could be changed
--by  taxing  all  income,  by  exempting  income  that  falls  below  a  specified
threshold, by charging progressive tax rates, and/or by removing the ceiling on
taxable  wages.  The  fact  that  this  has  practically  never  been  done  under
traditional systems, however,  suggests that  strong political  economy  forces
prevent them from redistributing income to the poor.
6General revenue finance might be more progressive than the payroll tax in
industrial countries, because it imposes a lower relative burden on low wage-
earners. However, it  adds a  new equity  problem in  developing countries  where only
a portion of the labor force--generally the better-off portion--is covered by
social security. For example, in Brazil in the 1980's 75% of the top income
quintile but less than 15%  of the  bottom  quintile was covered  by social security.
If general  tax revenues from the broad population are used to cover pension
costs,  this means  that  outsiders,  who  are  less well  off,  are  subsidizing
insiders. This happens in Guatemala, where general revenues are used to finance
one-third of the costs of the public pension program which covers only a small
minority of its labor force, those who are relatively high earners in the formal
sector  (World  Bank 1994, pp. 132-3).
Finally, "capricious" redistributions also occur in DB systems, e.g. from
dual to single wage earning families, from women who work in the labor market to
those who  work  at  home,  from non-evaders  to evaders, and  from workers  who
postpone  retirement  to those who  retire early. The  non-transparency  of  the
benefit formulas enables these redistributions to occur without an open public
evaluation--and enables  groups with power and  expertise to manipulate the system
to  their  advantage.  Besides  their  perverse  impact  on  equity,  these
redistributions create incentives for workers  (women,  evaders, early retirees)
to  withdraw from  the formal labor  market  and they  thereby impede  economic growth.
Redistributions to  early cohorts from  later  cohorts. Generally payroll tax
rates in PAYG plans are low initially, because they must cover only a small
number of retirees, but they rise through time, as the system matures and the
dependency rate increases. The forthcoming demographic transition exacerbates
this transfer. As a result, covered workers who retire in the first 20-30 years
of a PAYG scheme contribute for only part of their working lives, and at a low
rate, hence receive in  benefits much  more than  they have  contributed, while their
children and grandchildren get back less than they paid in and lower rates of
return than they  could have earned  elsewhere. For  example, in the  U.S. real rates
of return were 15% for workers who retired in the 1950's or 1960's and 8% for
7those  retiring  in  the 1970's--signifying  large positive  transfers  to  these
cohorts. But the rate of return is expected to fall to 2% for workers who retire
in  the future,  less than  they could  get  elsewhere--signifying  a negative transfer
(World  Bank 1994, pp. 133-36). That is, there is a permanent transfer of income
from later to earlier cohorts. If  the income  transfer is consumed  by the old and
the promise of future benefits reduces the retirement savings of the young, it
accounts for the possib]y negative impact  of PAYG on national saving and growth.
Does this transfer increase or decrease equity?
Sometimes  we may  want to redistribute  across  generations; this  may be a  way
to allow older cohorts to enjoy some of the fruits of future growth. However, a
problem  with using PAYG  systems for this purpose  is that  inter-generational
redistribution  takes place automatically, without a full discussion, or even
without a full public understanding, of what is going to happen. In most cases,
the  people  who  are  being  redistributed  away  from  weren't  old  enough  to
participate in the discussion; only the gainers participated--raising question
about equity from the procedural point of view. Moreover, many of the  gainers in
the  older generation, including  those  who get  the largest  transfers,  are lifetime
high earners, while losers from the younger generations include low earners.
For example, suppose the annual rate of real wage growth is 2W, so the
average wage doubles in 3b  years. Compare the income and transfers received by
a  high earner (who  gets twice the average wage) when the pension program starts,
with those of a low earner (who  gets half the average wage), 36 years younger.
Even taking into  account real  wage growth, the  older  worker has a lifetime income
that  is  double  that  of  the  younger  worker,  yet  he  receives  a  positive
redistribution from the  pension plan, while the  younger worker receives a low or
negative redistribution  (that is, he loses money)  ,  because contribution rates
have risen and benefit rates fallen in the interim.
This kind of redistribution from  young low earners to old high earners is
especially likely to  occur given that  the first  cohorts to  be covered  are usually
well  off  groups  while  later  additions  to  the  plan  include poorer  groups.
Ironically, even within the older cohorts, the above-market rate of return they
8receive  translates  into  a  much  larger  lifetime  income  transfer  for  their
wealthier  than their poorer members, since the former receive this generous
return on a much larger reference wage and contribution base. In Colombia, for
this reason, the absolute value of the transfer under the old PAYG system was
eight times larger for  a high income  worker than for a  minimum wage worker (World
Bank 1994, p. 135).
Finally,  the  younger  generation  as  a  whole  loses  because  of  the
inefficiencies and growth-inhibiting features of traditional social security
programs.
These  inter-generational  redistributions,  that  often  favor  wealthier
members  of the older cohorts, are unavoidable in PAYG schemes. While equity
inevitably involves value judgements,  most people would agree that these intra-
and inter-generational redistributions are not equitable in terms of procedure
or outcome. Moreover, some of the inequities imply incentives or transfers that
simultaneously reduce efficiency, and some of the inefficiencies seem likely to
particularly hurt low income groups. Thus, there is ample room to improve both
equity and efficiency in traditional DB PAYG systems.
III.  Efficiency  Improvements  in Reformed  Systems
Starting with Chile in 1980, followed by Colombia, Peru, Mexico, Uruguay
and possibly Bolivia  in the 1990's, many Latin American countries have been
reforming their pension systems, in an effort to get greater efficiency while
improving equity at the same time. These countries have instituted multi-pillar
systems that are partially funded (instead  of being largely PAYG), that utilize
private management of these funds (instead  of pure public management), that tie
benefits  directly  to workers'  contributions plus  investment earnings  (in a
defined contribution rather  than  a defined  benefit  plan) and that, in  most cases,
have a  separate public  tax-financed mechanism for  redistributing retirement
income  to  low earners.  Specifically, these  systems generally  contain  three
components, or pillars:
9a mandatory publicly-managed tax-financed pillar for redistribution;
a mandatory privately-managed fully funded pillar for saving; and
a voluntary pillar for people who want more protection in old age.
The second  pillar, which is FF  DC, is the core of most of these plans, and
is the most innovative  part of the  pension reforms.  Essentially, people would  be
required to save for their old age, and this pillar would handle their savings.
Let  me briefly explain why it is supposed  to eliminate the distortionary effects
described in Part I.
Why  should  an  FF DC plan  raise efficiency? The  close linkage between
benefits and  contributions, in  a  defined  contribution  plan, is  designed to reduce
labor market distortions, such  as evasion  by  escape to the  informal sector, since
people are less likely to regard their contribution as a tax. And those who do
evade bear the cost in the form of lower benefits rather than passing the costs
on to others; in contrast to DB plans where evasion  requires a contribution rate
increase to cover  total costs, thereby  setting  off a  vicious cycle  that increases
the distortionary effects.
Also in a  DC  plan the  ac,ouurulated  contributions  and  investment earnings  are
eventually converted  into the worker's retirement income, via an annuity or
gradual withdrawals. This means that people are less likely to retire early--
since if they do they will bear the cost in the form of lower annual benefits.
It also means that as longevity increases, many workers will choose to work
longer instead of retiring  at the  previous age with a lower annual pension--thus
retirement age is automatically increased  by the individual without a difficult
political decision.
The principle of full funding  means that countries won't make promises at
the early stage of  a plan, that  will result in fiscal  deficits and  high tax rates
later on. It also helps to build long term national savings which will increase
productivity and growth, hence raise both wages and pensions in the future. If
a developing  country  institutes a multi-pillar  system without  a  prior PAYG
system, private saving will increase if the mandatory saving rate exceeds the
voluntary rate and  crowd-out effects  are  small. If  an industrialized  country  with
10an existing PAYG system replaces it  with a multi-pillar system, national saving
increases if  benefits are  cut  or taxes are increased,  usually to cover transition
costs. If a country with partial coverage shifts to a partially funded system,
as in Latin America, we would expect a mixture of these two effects. The funds
are privately managed to ensure that economic rather than political objectives
dominate and that the rate of return--both to the fund and to the economy as a
whole--is maximized. Private  pension funds  are more likely to enjoy the benefits
of investment  diversification, including international diversification,  that
enables them to increase their yield and reduce their risk--thereby enhancing
efficiency. Moreover, they are likely to spur financial market development, by
creating a demand  for new financial instruments and institutions--especially
important in middle income countries such as those in Latin America.
For  all  these reasons,  the  reforming  countries  expected  economic efficiency
to  improve with the  establishment oL  their  new pension systems.  What has actually
happened?
Empirical  evidence  on  growth  effects. Growth  effects  are  notoriously
diffi.cult  to quantify and  prove, in  part because relatively  little  experience and
data are available and in part because, even if we had the data, it would be
difficult to  build models that  capture  all the  complex  dynamic interactions; that
is,  it  is hard  to specify  the counter-factual. Nevertheless,  the available
evidence indicates that the observed growth effects are positive and possibly
large. They come mainly  from increased national  saving and  financial market
development,  since  the effects on retirement age and  evasion are even more
difficult to measure at this point. (For  a summary see James 1996).
Two  types of  evidence are available--simulations that  estimate  future
changes, and econometric or descriptive analysis of  actual changes. For example,
4n  planning  its mandatory  occupational  scheme, to which  contributions  will
eventually reach 12% of payroll, Australia estimated that national saving would
increase by 1.5% of GDP in the long run, thereby augmenting by 70% its current
net national saving rate (which is 2.2% of GDP) (Bateman  and Piggott 1997). In
simulations for Mexico, total saving was found to rise between  .4%  and 2.1% of
11GDP, if the transition is tax-financed (or  if it is debt-financed and Ricardian
equivalence  holds  so  that  private  saving  goes  up  to  offset  public
dissaving)(Ayala 1996).
The  only two countries that have had a pension reform long enough for
saving effects to be estimated are Switzerland and Chile. In Switzerland the
national saving rate rose from 6 to 8.5% of GDP in the decade after the funded
second  pillar became mandatory and the entire increase  occurred in  pension funds
and related institutions such as insurance companies (Hepp 1997).
According  to  regression  analyses  (Haindl Rondonelli,  1996;  also  see
Morande, 1996), pension reform played a major role in increasing the national
saving rete in  Chile from 16.7%  of GDP pre-reform (1976-80)  to 26.6%  post-reform
(1990-94)  . Specifically, pension saving  accounts for  two-thirds of the increase.
A more modest positive effect on private saving,  4% of GNP by 1994,  was found by
Agosin,  Crespi and Letelier  (1996). All these analyses are very preliminary,
given  the short  time period involved and ambiguities concerning  the correct
specification and counter-factual.
The fiscal costs of the transition, if financed by borrowing, may have
canceled out the positive effect on private  saving  (see Agosin et al 1996).
However, to the degree that the transition was financed by increased taxes or
reduced  public  consumption,  the  positive  effect  on  national  saving  was
reinforced. While  we do  not know what  would  have happened  without pension reform,
the  Chilean government  accumulated  a  fiscal  surplus  while  planning for the  reform
in the late 1970's, it then rani  a fiscal deficit in the early 1980's shortly
after  the  reform  was  instituted,  and  by  the  late  1980's  and  1990's  the
government's budget was in surplus again.
Even  more  important is  the financial market deepening  induced by  the
reformed  pension  system.  While  insurance  and  annuities  markets  have  been
stimulated to  grow and develop  new  products even in  countries such  as Switzerland
and Australia, the biggest effect here is observed in Chile. Chilean financial
markets have become more liquid as the pension funds  have increasingly invested
in a diversifiad portfolio of stocks as well as bonds; the number of traded
12shares and their turnover increased;  demand  was created for  the  equities of newly
privatized  state  enterprises;  information  disclosure  and  credit-rating
institutions  have developed;  the variety of  financial instruments  including
indexed annuities,  mortgage and corporate  bonds have  grown; and  asset  pricing has
improved.  Preliminary  econometric  analysis  indicates  that  financial  market
deepening  induced  by  the  reformed  pension  system  increased  total  factor
productivity 1t per year, or half of the increase in total factor productivity
in Chile  (Holzmann 1996)  . So we have both a priori and ex post reasons to be
optimistic about the efficiency and growth effects of pension reform in Latin
America.
IV. Equity Under The Reformed Systems
What  about  equity?  While  a  careful  quantitative  analysis  of  the
distributional effects of the reforrns  has yet to be carried out, it appears that
the worst inequities of the old system have been avoided, but some remain, and
some  new problems have  been introduced.  Moreover,  an evaluation  of equity  effects
depends  closely on value  judgements about what  is equitable. Which  is more
equitable--a reduction in inequality while the average pension is unchanged or
an improvement in the pension received by all income groups while inequality
increases? Which is preferred--redistribution to all the poor, to the poor who
have contributed  for most  of their working lives, or  to lower middle  class
workers as  well? In  other words, who should  get a boost in  the  name of equity and
do we care  more about absolute or  relative  positions?  Different reform  plans  have
different answers to these questions.
Elimination of old equity problems. All of these reform plans include an
FF DC  pillar  which  should  improve equity  in the broad  sense  that they are
designed to stimulate economic growth; in the long run this is the best way to
raise the income of low and middle class earners  (see Valdes-Prieto 1994 for
simulations that demonstrate this effect)  . Moreover, they  give these low  earners
access to capital market investments, which previously were available only to
13high earners, and which have the potential to yield high returns (see  ReDort of
the Advisory Committee on the U.S. Social Security System, 1997, which projects
a higher expected return to reform options that include a large funded pillar).
The  replacement of  DB by DC  removes special benefits  to privileged  groups,
including early retirement benefits, advantages to workers who have steep age-
earnings profiles,  and the subsidy of  insiders by those outside the system.
Funding  a  large  part  of  the  pension  system  reduces  inter-generational
redistribution as well as the  disparate  return  between early  groups to  be covered
and late entrants that  occurs in  pure PAYG systems.  Beyond that, practically all
of the reformed systems include  a publicly managed component, or pillar, that is
targeted to low income  groups and is therefore likely to be more equalizing than
traditional systems  that  provided a  higher  pension to  high  wage earners.  However,
this  public pillar  takes very different  forms  in different  countries, with
different distributional ef'ects.
Comparison of equity effects of different public pillars. Chile provides
a minimum pension guarantee to all workers who have contributed for at least 20
years, supplemented by social assistance for others. Both of these are financed
out of general revenue rather than the payroll tax; this is a more broad-based,
efficient, and probably more progressive revenue source. Partial reliance on
general revenue finance reduces the  disproportionate utility loss to low  earners
that is implied by a flat payroll tax (see  earlier discussion)  . The danger that
low income outsiders will be subsidizing insiders is  offset by the means-tested
social assistance program.
The minimum guarantee, now pegged at about 28% of the average wage, is
enough  to keep pensioners out of poverty.  If the annual benefit that can be
financed by a worker's own accumulation is less than the minimum guarantee, the
pension is topped up by the government to bring it  up to the threshold. If a low
income worker  (say,  one earning half the average wage) contributes for only 20
years, he is likely to  need some topping up, but if  he contributes for 40 years,
his own accumulation will probably suffice. Thus low income workers who have
lifetime formal  labor market  participation  will  not get  a redistribution,  and the
14converse  is also true. No benefit at all  is provided to lower middle  class
workers whose own accumulation will push them just above the threshold. If your
concept of equity is to bring all people to the  poverty line, the Chilean scheme
is just right, but if your concept includes a redistribution to low wage and
lower middle class workers who have contributed for many years  (as would be
accomplished by a guarantee that increases with years of service), the Chilean
scheme is  not optimal from  an equity  point of view. Its  cost should  be very low--
but we do not yet know how low since few workers have retired under the new
system.
In  contrast, Argentina provides a flat  benefit, also 28-30% of the average
wage,  to  all  retirees  who  have  contributed  for  30  years--a  much  costlier
arrangement than that in Chile. Unlike Chile, middle and upper income workers
receive  the public  benefit  in Argentina--in  fact,  they receive  larger than
average lifetime benefits because of their greater longevity. But low income
workers  continue  to  receive  the  largest  share of  the  total,  because  they
constitute the largest group. The benefit is financed by a payroll tax, up to a
taxable ceiling. This financing source  means that low income  groups pay a larger
share of the total cost and a larger share of their total income than in Chile,
and some inter-generational transfers remain.
The  flat benefit in  Argentina  goes only to  workers  who have contributed for
most of their lifetimes, in sharp contrast  to Chile where long term contributors
are unlikely to receive anything. This benefit and tax structure means that low
wage  earners  with  less  than  30  years  of participation  are  big  losers  in
Argentina; women are disproportionately losers. On the other hand, middle class
workers with more than 30 years' service fare  better in  Argentina than in  Chile;
their retirement income  is  increased  and  diversified, thereby  reducing  risk.  Thus
Chile scores higher on keeping  people out  of poverty  at the lowest  possible cost,
but Argentina scores higher on rewarding the average worker who has contributed
to the system rather than evading, throughout his life (see  Figure 1).
Australia,  far awav  from Latin America, has also reformed  its pension
system but  retains  a means-  and asset-tested benefit  in its public  pillar,
15financed out of general revenues.  The Australian guarantee is  more generous than
that in Chile, is received by many more people  (currently two-thirds of all
pensioners, but this proportion will probably decrease as the mandatory saving
plan is phased in) and therefore costs much more. The fact that it takes other
income and assets into account makes it more equalizing but may also discourage
saving from other sources. While less targeted than the Chilean system, it is
probably more redistributive to low income groups than the Argentinean system,
because  it  is  financed  out  of  general  revenues,  is not  tied  to  years  of
contributions, and excludes the top earners from benefits.
In  all three cases,  perverse intra-  and inter-generational redistributions
are reduced by the  partial reliance on  a DC plan and a  public pillar that is  more
targeted toward low earners than was the case under traditional PAYG DB plans.
Other countries have chosen yet other forms for their social safety nets. For
example,  in  Mexico  the  government  deposits  one  peso  per  day  into  every
contributing worker's account (which  will eventually yield a small benefit per
year of contributing service) and workers are guaranteed a minimum pension as
well.  These cases provide us with an idea of the wide  range of benefit and
financing  options available  in  the public  pillar, and  their diverse  equity
effects.
Remaining problems and new problems. New equity problems arise, however,
from the design of the private funded pillar. Some of these problems might be
termed capricious distributional effects, and some of them involve systematic
biases in favor of high income groups.
1. Capricious  distributions. Random  fluctuations in the  interest rate
across  time  have  unpredictable  distributional  effects  on  the  pensions  of
different cohorts in  an FF DC  plan. Some cohorts  will be exposed to  high interest
rates, while others will face low rates during the years in which they work and
accumulate. In a DC plan, the former group could receive a much higher pension
than the latter--a capricious effect that is due to accidental market forces
rather  than  individual  behavior  or  government  policy. While  this  does  not
represent "redistribution"  it  might be  considered "inequitable."  The chance that
16this will  happen is  mitigated by international  diversification  of investments  and
by the long term  nature of retirement investments;  and it  can  be partially offset
by  the  public  pillar,  which  diversifies  sources  of  retirement  income.
Nevertheless, different cohorts wiJ.l  fare differently in a DC plan, through no
fault or credit of their own, for this reason.
A different type of equity problem is created in the annuities market by
the interest rate at the point of retirement.  If the interest rate is low at
that time, this will reduce the size of the annuity that can be purchased by
retiring cohorts with a given accumulation. They can avoid "locking in" to this
low interest rate by purchasing variable annuities, whose value varies with the
interest rate  and  the price of  financial assets. Nevertheless,  this  choice
between  a  low  fixed  annuity  versus  an  uncertain  variable  annuity  will  be
considered a choice between two evils by workers who are risk-averse; one might
consider  it inequitable  that some  cohorts, but  not  others, will  face this
problem. Thus, certain types of capricious  distributional effects  are eliminated
by the shift from a DB to a DC plan, but others are created.
2.  Systematic  biases  in  favor  of  high  earners. More  troublesome  are
systematic biases that advantage high wage-earners. These biases stem from the
way annuities markets and privately managed FF DC plans operate. In situations
where these biases are large, the new and old pension systems may end up having
very similar distributional consequences.
First, if high and low earners are put into the same annuity pool, at the
point when they convert  their  retirement accumulation  into  a  pension, low earners
will end up paying more than their expected benefits while the opposite is true
for high earners, who are likely to live longer--just as was the case under
traditional DB plans. Most of the reformed systems allow low earners to avoid
this loss of real income by choosing a gradual withdrawal of their retirement
accumulation,  instead of requirinq the purchase of an annuity--but those who
choose this option do so at the expense of foregoing longevity insurance. It is
possible that competition  in  the  annuities  markets  will eventually  produce  better
17rates for low earners, who belong in a lower risk category, but as yet this has
not happened.
Second, low wage workers are likely to have a higher discount rate and
therefore to suffer a greater utility loss from the mandated saving for all the
reasons that were mentioned earlier in connection with PAYG plans--their income
is  lower, the required contribution  is  a higher  proportion of their  total income,
and they are less able to dissave part of their voluntary saving to maintain
their current consumptions levels, because they have little or no voluntary
savings to dissave. The last  point may be even more relevant to FF DC plans than
to PAYG DB plans. But basically, the current cost of any mandatory retirement
plan is likely to  be more binding on and more painful to the young poor than the
young rich. This is one reason for including a large compensating component in
the system that targets future benefits to the poor, as in the public pillar of
a multi-pillar system.
Other problems such a low coverage  and high evasion may remain--the former
because of compliance difficulties in developing countries with many small or
self-employed enterprises and the latter because of the high discount rate of
many workers and the high payroll taxes imposed for  other services. However, the
equity implications of low coverage and high evasion are different in DC and DC
plans; in  DC plans they are less likely  to result in subsidies from outsiders to
insiders and from non-evaders to evaders.
Third, the privately managed FF DC plans have been criticized for their
high administrative costs, relative to well-run centralized systems that enjoy
economies of scale and do not incur marketing costs. If the pension investment
companies  cover  these  costs  by  charging  a  flat  fee per  account  for  their
services,  those  with  low  contributions  and  assets  will  suffer  a  larger
deterioration in their net returns. The flat fee may be non-discriminatory, in
the sense that it  reflects the  real cost  of  maintaining (keeping  records, sending
statements for) each account, but it nevertheless hurts low earners more than
high  earners.  Put another  way, different  investment strategies and  pension
systems may be appropriate for high and low wage earners. If one system offers
18higher gross returns but also higher administrative costs that are uniform per
account, while  another system  offers lower  gross returns  but lower  administrative
expenses per account, low earners might fare better under the latter, on a net
return basis. Forcing them to choose the former may leave them with lower net
returns than they could get elsewhere.
This line of thought leads to the  possibility that flat fees should  not be
permitted in mandatory programs (implying  cross-subsidies between high and low
earners),  or  that  fees charged  to low earners  should be  subsidized by  the
government, or that each pension fund should be required to offer at least one
investment option where the costs are small for small accounts. In the case of
Chile,  the spread between gross to net returns was indeed high, and it was
highest for low earners, especially during the early years of the program (Shah,
1996)  . As time  passed this  spread  declined and  competition (or  adverse  publicity)
forced most  pension  funds to phase  out  their flat fees, without government
intervention--but the same problem remains in other Latin American countries.
This may be one reason why low wage workers have not shifted to the new system
in Peru, while high wage workers have shifted.
A fourth problem for low earners arises if they are less informed than
their wealthier counterparts about financial alternatives. They may make poor
financial decisions, and be misled by unscrupulous salesmen, about investment
choices. In England, when workers were permitted to opt out of their employers'
plans, many workers were induced  to  buy insurance  policies that  were  not in  their
best  interest. Low wage  earners may be more prone  to this  sort of mistake,
although we have no evidence that this is the case. We do have evidence from the
choices made in 401(k) plans in the U.S. that low earners are more likely to be
overly conservative, to choose a "safe"  portfolio of government bonds, that in
fact is unsafe in the sense that is bound to yield a relatively low rate of
return.
To avoid this  problem it is essential to have a public education campaign
informing  workers  about  how  to  make  good  investment  decisions  and  tight
regulation  of  the funded pillar.  The  regulation  should exclude  unqualified
19pension  fund  managers, reauire diversified investments, and set  forth clear
infoxmation disclosure standards, thereby limiting the risk and the possibility
of making very bad investment choices. So far every reforming Latin American
country has imposed such regulations. Another possibility is to structure the
program  so  that  the  investment  choice  is  delegated  to  those  with  greater
financial expertise, such  as employers  and union representatives, who act for  an
entire occupational or company-wide group of workers, both rich and poor. This
course has been followed in OECD countries such as Australia and Switzerland.
While it may reduce informational  problems and administrative costs, it  may also
create principal-agent problems, to the detriment of workers.
Nevertheless, even in  a  well-regulated system,  the fact remains that where
there is choice, inequality is likely to increase.  Moreover, investment returns
and labor returns may be correlated,  making the income  distribution more unequal
over-all. At the same time, the expected return to all participants, both high
and low earners, is greater than that expected from a continuation of the old
PAYG system. This is due to the  higher expected  growth rate it generates and the
higher return  to funded  plans, given the  unfavorable  demographics that  lie ahead.
Which is  better--a regimen  where  almost  everyone  gets a  higher pension,  but
the variance among individuals has increased, or one where participants get a
lower but more uniform pension? As with the choice  between targeting low income
groups  (Chile and  Australia)  versus  rewarding  all  long  term  contributors
(Argentina),  the  answer is  not  objective  and clear-cut;  every society  and citizen
must make a value judgement on these issues.
Finally, opponents of multi-pillar pension systems have argued that once
the redistributive objective becomes more transparent, as it does in all the
reformed systems, high income  groups will become less willing to make transfers
to low  income groups. This argument rests on the assumption that redistribution
occurs in nontransparent PAYG DB systems because high earners have been fooled,
but once they learn the truth, they  pull  back on the  transfers. This is a curious
line  of  thought,  especially  in  view  of empirical  evidence  indicating  that
traditional systems did not in fact redistribute  much from  rich to poor--perhaps
20because the rich quickly learned how the system operated and how they could
manipulate  it  to  their advantage.  While  the willingness  of  the  "haves" to
redistribute  to the  "have nots" is probably very limited,  it may  indeed be
greater for systems that accomplish this  redistribution in  the cheapest and most
efficient way--and the reformed systems have the edge on these grounds.
V. Conclusion
As Latin  American countries have reformed  their pension systems, they have
not faced  a trade-off  between eTuity and efficiency. In  fact, this is  one of  many
instances where countries were initially operating well within the efficiency-
equity frontier; it was possible to have more of both.
The new systems show  both  promise and  evidence of  being  more efficient than
the old. They have also eliminated or greatly reduced some of the pre-existing
equity problems, stemming from  poorly designed defined  benefit formulas  and pay-
as-you-go finance methods. At the same time, they have introduced new equity
problems, stemming from annuity  pricing, savings offsets, administrative costs,
imperfect  information  and inequality  under  choice.  Thus,  perverse  redistributions
wlithin  cohorts are still possible, although inter-generational redistributions
are less likely. While we are beginning to have empirical estimations of the
growth effects of the reformed systems--and they  are optimistic--as of yet we do
not have empirical analyses of their distributional effects. This is, in part,
because these  calculations should  be done on  a lifetime  basis and the new systems
have not been in place for anyone's lifetime. It is also, in part, because we
cannot calculate the changes in distribution  brought about by the  reforms unless
we know the counter-factual, and this is quite different from the status quo,
which  is non-sustainable  in every existing PAYG system. Finally, we may get
different answers depending on whether we define equity as reducing inequality,
eliminating poverty, or in some other way.
As we have seen,  distributional effects  depend on many detailed aspects of
the system; pension reform can accommodate a variety of value judgements about
21equity. And diverse pension systems, both reformed and unreformed, can end up
having similar distributional effects, albeit by different routes. While  the
efficiency improvements from  pension reform create the  possibility of improving
everyone's welfare, in  reality the  gains  are  distributed unevenly  and some  people
lose. The identity of the winners and losers depends in part on the ability of
different groups to use whatever opportunities are presented to them--and this
is likely to be positively correlated with prior income, assets and education.
But it also depends on many detailed features of the reform, in particular the
design of the public pillar and the treatment of administrative costs in the
private  pillar,  which must  therefore be  specified with great  care and with
calculations about the distributional effects of alternative options.
On the  one hand,  if you believe  that the underlying  configuration of
political power in  a country is  fixed and shapes the  distributional consequences
of its policies, the details of the new and old pension systems are endogenous
and will be chosen to  bring about very similar distributions. On the other hand,
if  you believe that the adoption of a new pension system reflects and reinforces
a changing pattern of political power, this implies that it may be designed to
have different and possibly more equitable distributional consequences than the
old. We can hope for the latter and strive to bring it about, but only careful
empirical analysis in the future  will allow  us to  determine if  this goal has  been
achieved.
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